The problem of creating political networks that can exercise power across a nation is solved anew in every generation by leaders who rise to positions of power in their society.
Political leaders are the ultimate guarantors of incentives in government, and corruption in government agencies can be reduced only where leaders are willing to make appropriate efforts for discipline. But any political leader needs a reputation for reliably rewarding the service of his active supporters and agents. So in any political system, the state must be expected at least to protect rights to promised rewards for the loyal supporters of the state's political leaders.
The critical question of political economy, then, is whether property rights are securely protected only for a small elite who actively support the national ruler, or does the circle of trust extend more broadly to include people throughout the nation. Members in the securely protected group require some legal and political power that could be used against a government official who failed to protect their rights. A broad distribution of such power to threaten the privileged status of government officials may naturally seem inconvenient to established national leaders, but people who have been admitted into this circle of political trust can invest securely in the state, increasing economic growth. A fundamental fact of modern economic growth is that it requires decentralized economic investment by many individuals who must feel secure in the protection of their right to profit from their investments. Thus, modern economic growth requires a wide distribution of political voice and power throughout the nation.
In any society, leaders govern through authority that depends on a broad recognition of their political position, and this in turn can depend on their complying with generally recognized constitutional rules that characterize the nation's political system. Political systems can differ on at least two major dimensions that fundamentally affect the distribution of power in a society: democracy and decentralization. Democratic political systems distribute political voice more broadly in a nation by making leadership of government dependent on free expressions of popular approval from a large fraction of the nation's citizens. Decentralized political systems distribute power more widely to autonomous provincial and local units of government.
Power can be applied throughout a nation only by a political network that spans the nation, reaching into every community. Relationships between local and national political leaders are vital elements in the structure of any state. In any political system, national leaders can wield their power only with trust and support of local officials throughout the nation, and local leaders in turn rely on national leaders to affirm their privileged positions of local power.
But under different constitutional systems, the primary leaders of local government may be agents appointed by the national leadership, or they may earn their positions by autonomous local politics. This distinction between centralized and decentralized states should be seen as one of the primary dimensions on which states vary, potentially as important as the distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Decentralized federal democracy and centralized unitary democracy may have significantly different implications for economic development.
Historical perspectives on local government and development
For a perspective on the roots of successful economic development in early modern England, we may start with the remarkable observation of Adam Smith (1776):
"In England, a lease for life of forty shillings a year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to vote for a member of parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have freeholds of this kind, the whole order becomes respectable to their landlords on account of the political consideration which this gives them.
There is, I believe, nowhere in Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement.
Those laws and customs so favourable to the yeomanry have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken together." (Wealth of Nations, Book III, Chapter 2, p. 415)
The central focus of the economics profession since Adam Smith has been on regulations of commerce that can encourage greater economic growth. But in this passage, Smith tells us that basic political and legal rights for small farmers, which enabled them to invest in improving their land without fear that the benefits of such improvements would be expropriated by a landlord increasing the rent, may have been the most important factor in the prosperity of England in his time. He indicates that this empowerment of poor tenant farmers was a result of particular legal and political institutions of England, including the participation of small farmers in local parliamentary elections. Political developments in England that gave political voice to a great mass of small farmers in turn enabled them to invest securely in economic improvements which marked the start of modern economic development.
Mass local political participation was also significantly cultivated in the British colonies 4 in North America that became the United States, but not in other parts of the world. Important insights into the problems of development can be found in a study of comparative local government in colonial India by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) .
When the British were first establishing their rule in India in the eighteenth century, they regularly granted local power and privileges to local agents called zamindars, who had primary responsibility for collecting local land taxes. Holding local power as a permanent property right, the zamindars became a class of local leaders with a vested interest in British rule. The people who were initially recruited to serve as local zamindar lords for their communities may have already had some traditional political support in those communities. But the demands of subservience to foreign domination may have been resisted by many of those who would have been the strongest contenders for local leadership under traditional pre-colonial forms of local politics. In many cases, surely the colonial administrators must have instead promoted some secondary candidate for local leadership who could not have hoped to rise so high in his community without the foreigners' support. Thereafter, these zamindars and their local adherents would have enjoyed privileges that were dependent on their reliably collecting local taxes and maintaining local order in their domains. Thus, the system of local political authority was transformed in wide areas of India to create a network of local feudal agents who could be counted on to maintain the British imperial dominion. In return, the higher administration of the British Empire in India was constrained to maintain the system of local privileges for the zamindars on whom the Empire relied.
In the early nineteenth century, reformers argued that the large rents taken by these feudal zamindars were a costly political expense depleting the wealth of India and the empire. Then areas that subsequently came under direct British rule were given other forms of local administration, with responsibility for the collection of local land taxes being given either to local village councils or to provincial administrators. After the 1857 Mutiny challenged British rule in India, however, the British returned to apply the zamindar system in new additions to their colonial territory.
The effectiveness of the zamindars' power proved remarkably durable, with consequences for Indian society even after the feudal system was formally abolished at the end of the colonial period. More than half a century after independence, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) found evidence of lower agricultural productivity and higher infant mortality in the regions of India that endured 5 local rule by feudal zamindars. Indian peasants in these regions clearly lacked the kind of legal and political rights that Adam Smith saw as so important for English yeomen. The lesson seems clear: Feudalism can help to establish a stable political regime, but the feudal redistribution of local political power can also have serious long-term economics costs. We should ask, how much of global poverty and underdevelopment has resulted from such feudal strategies of traditional and colonial state-building?
The system of local government can have economic implications not only for the security of investments by small farmers and tradesmen, but also for larger investments in industry and public infrastructure. Here, again, it is worth considering some lessons from the England on the verge of the industrial revolution.
In the eighteenth century, turnpike trusts built toll roads that gave England the world's best land transportation system, which set the stage for the industrial revolution (Albert, 2007) .
These toll roads were managed by local county leaders, who retained profits from tolls on wellmaintained roads, but the tolls had to be nationally regulated as part of a national transportation A stark contrast may be seen in the frustration of early industrial development in late imperial China, as described by Feuerwerker (1958) . In China during the late nineteenth century, provincial governors sponsored new corporations for modern shipping, telegraphs, and railroads. But any reinvested profits from these corporations would be vulnerable to Today, even without Western-style democracy, the government of China has a federal constitutional structure, which can guarantee that profits of corporate investments sponsored by local government officials can be retained locally. The result has been a spectacular economic growth with industrial entrepreneurship sponsored by local officials throughout China. Thus, China's economic development in the past forty years has depended on the development of a federal political system in which the national government is strong enough to prevent local governments from creating monopolistic restraints on inter-regional trade but is also weak enough to be credibly held to profit-sharing agreements with local leaders. Weingast (1995) has called this market-preserving federalism.
In diagnosing the disappointing failures of economic growth in Africa in the generation after independence, van de Walle (2001) and Bates (2008) depict the African states as administratively weak in their ability to implement economic policies, but as politically strong in their ability to suppress challenges to the national leaders' positions. This combination of weakness and strength perhaps should not be so surprising, as the political strength may itself be an explanation of administrative weakness. If a small group in the capital can hold recognized national power without much support from local leaders throughout the nation, then national leaders will have an incentive to concentrate the benefits of power among the small elite whose support they actually need to get and hold national power. Thus, we should not be surprised to find the pattern of postcolonial political development described by Bates (2008, chapters 3 and 4) in which national leaders progressively narrowed the range of those entitled to benefits of state power until rural farmers were heard to say "Independence isn't for us; it's only for city people" (Dumont, 1966, p 17) . This political narrowness can become a particularly acute problem in a centralized political system where the national president has the power to appoint governors and mayors, as these powerful local officials may understand that their privileged positions depend primarily on their loyal service to the president, not on any efforts to earn the local population's trust or approval.
Such minimal winning coalitions could retain stable control until the 1990s, when authoritarian governments suddenly lost the ability to get international financial support in exchange for aligning with one side or the other of the Cold War (Bates, 2008) . Then as international donors and domestic populations demanded more accountable governments, democracy spread widely in Africa after 1990. But as Bates (2008, p. 137) observes, the spread of democracy was at best a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it was the ability of authoritarian leaders to govern with a narrow base of support that laid the foundations for state failure. On the other hand, the political insecurity of competitive democracy could increase the motivation of a ruling faction to use its power to loot the nation for short-term benefits, instead of making investments for long-term national economic growth. In many African nations, the transition to constitutional democracy has seemed somehow misdirected or incomplete. Apparently there may be something more that we need to understand about constitutional change and the conditions for successful democracy.
Constitutional change and leaders' reputations
The American constitution is recognized as an elaborate system of checks and balances, in which elected officials exercise power under the law constrained by other elected officials.
But one might also see the American constitution as merely a paper document, which could not constrain anyone's behavior unless many others were expected to behave according to its stipulated rules. Whether such a constitution is in effect or not, then, is game-theoretically a question of multiple equilibria, subject to the focal-point effect described by Schelling (1960) . If history or tradition makes enough people believe that the constitution is an effective political law, then it is so; but otherwise it is just another mass of words.
The key is that constitutional laws must be affirmed by recognized political leaders. But Bremer's (2006) theory of the primacy of written constitutions would make it difficult to understand how they ever evolved in the first place. A complex system can be spontaneously self-organizing when it has many opportunities to start locally and then grow larger, which is 8 true of leader-follower networks, but not of constitutional law. In fact, the United States after the American Revolution began its independent political existence with a large supply of leaders who had been locally elected under British colonial rule long before the federal constitution was written. Indeed, the adoption of the United States constitution depended substantially on the longstanding personal political reputations of its authors.
Under any political system, political leaders can compete for power only if they can motivate active supporters by promises of future political patronage. Thus, I have argued (Myerson, 2008) , the need to maintain a reputation for reliably rewarding the service of their active supporters is the fundamental political law for political leaders everywhere In many countries of Africa, popular movements for democracy have established the principle that a national political leader can retain general acceptance of his position only by submitting to regular competitive elections. Then we may hope that the need to compete for popular approval should motivate democratic political leaders to offer better benefits of government for voters than authoritarian rulers would provide, just as competition in any economic market should motivate suppliers to offer better values for their customers than would be provided by a profit-maximizing monopolist. This is the basic argument for democracy.
Even a benevolent autocrat may find it difficult to resist his courtiers' urge for greater privileges if further exploitation of the public would entail no more risk of losing power.
But unfortunately, as Bates has observed, the benefits of democracy have often seemed scarce. To understand why, we need to think more carefully about the nature of democratic 9 political competition. We need a model that can help us to understand how democratic competition can fail to provide political incentives for leaders to provide better public service.
Re-thinking democracy and decentralization
Even with free elections, a corrupt political faction could maintain a grip on power if the voters believed that other candidates would not be any better. Successful democracy requires more than just elections; it requires alternative candidates who have good democratic reputations for using power responsibly to benefit the public at large, and not merely to reward a small circle of supporters. In a nation with a long tradition of democracy, there are typically many politicians who have such good democratic reputations. But in a new democracy, politicians with good democratic reputations are typically lacking. Aspiring politicians who have no real power can make fine speeches about better government, but they cannot demonstrate any ability to allocate public funds and patronage in a way that provides public goods and services for the population.
Voters may be reasonably skeptical of candidates' promises when they have no evidence of good public service in the past. Then voters would have no incentive to turn a corrupt incumbent out of office, if the alternative candidates were expected to be just as bad or worse. But if blatant corruption would not reduce the leader's chances of re-election, then he should have no incentive to prevent his supporters from enjoying corrupt benefits of power.
In a simple game-theoretic model, I have shown (Myerson, 2006) how such failure of democracy can be a rational equilibrium for a centralized unitary state, but this bad equilibrium can be eliminated by decentralizing a share of power to independently elected local and provincial governments. The key is that local governments create independent opportunities for local leaders to begin cultivating good democratic reputations. Then, if political leaders at all levels of government were expected to be uniformly corrupt, a local leader who offered better public service could establish a good reputation with the voters that could make him a serious contender for power at higher levels of government.
Thus, devolving some share of power and public budgetary responsibility to separately elected local and provincial governments can make national democratic competition more effective for the voters, as politicians can prove their qualifications for higher office by responsible service at lower levels of government. When the effectiveness of democratic competition is limited by a lack of competitors with good reputations for spending public funds responsibly, we should see local and provincial democracy as providing more opportunities for such reputations to develop. This argument for decentralized democracy can also be derived from the basic economic concept of barriers to entry. A successful system of democratic competition should reduce political leaders' ability to take corrupt profits from their positions as suppliers of government services. Economists understand, however, that the expected amount of profit-taking in a competitive market equilibrium may depend on barriers against the entry of new competitors.
By enabling more local politicians to prove their abilities to govern responsibly, federal decentralization and local democracy can reduce barriers against new entrants into the national political arena, and so can make national politics more competitive, thus sharpening the incentive for elected national leaders to provide better public services. In the United States, for example, many candidates for president have served previously as governor of a state (province).
The interactions between local and national politics can go both ways. We have argued that local democracy strengthens national democratic competition as successful local leaders can become candidates for higher offices. But national democracy can also strengthen local democratic competition, as national parties can support alternatives to established local bosses.
The risk of local government being dominated by an unpopular local autocrat can be countered by the participation of competitive national political parties in local elections. Local political bosses should know that, if they lose popular support, they could face serious challengers supported by a rival national party. Competitive national political parties played an important role in the successful introduction of local democracy in Bolivia as described by Faguet (2012) .
Crook and Manor (1998) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) offer cross-national evidence that the benefits of political decentralization can depend on strong competitive political parties.
The potential of autonomous subnational governments to become sources of new competition for national power is one important reason why established national leaders are generally not inclined to share power with locally elected governors and mayors. Thus, we have reason to expect that political decentralization may often be undersupplied, relative to what would be best for the general population, as it runs against the vested interests of those who hold power at the national level. In Pakistan, elected politicians of national and provincial government have three times dissolved institutions of local democracy that had been created by military rulers (Cheema, Khan, and Myerson, 2010) . In Egypt, both the new constitution of 2012 and the previous constitution of 1971 have promised to form and empower elected local councils, but only gradually, with the same word "gradually" appearing in the English translations of both constitutions (article 235 in new, article 162 in old). In forty years under the old regime, this long-promised gradual decentralization never happened.
Political decentralization compels national leaders to cede the power to appoint governors, mayors, and other powerful local officials, which in a centralized state can be among the most prized positions that a national leader can use to reward loyal supporters. Indeed, we should understand that the performance of any system of government can depend critically on whether its provincial chief executives or governors are chosen by central political appointment or by decentralized local politics. A strong state needs networks of political trust that reach from the capital into every community, and provincial governors are vital links between national and local leaders.
As the primary agent of state power in his province, a governor occupies a powerful office with substantial opportunities for profiting from corrupt abuse of power. When national leaders can appoint governors, these offices can be used as valuable rewards for central political supporters. But then, if local people have no political role, the national leader may not be inclined to object when a governor uses his power to enrich himself instead of trying to build trust with the local population. Of course, the national leader might also be concerned about the adverse impact of a governor's corruption on the local tax base. In a nation without efficient mechanisms for domestic taxation, however, the economic loss of the local tax base may be worth less to the national leader than the political value of allowing corrupt profits from the province to be taken as his promised reward for a key supporter. From this perspective, we can readily understand much of the narrowness and decline of state capacity outside the capital that Bates (2008) has described. Unfortunately, this argument can apply even in a centralized democratic system, at least in provinces that are considered unlikely to provide many votes that the national leader will need for reelection. This tendency to weaken the state in politically peripheral provinces can be countered by constitutional requirements to share power with autonomous local leaders who are products of local politics. Once established, an accepted federal division of power can become selfsustaining, as national leaders' reputations for respecting local constitutional privileges become essential for their ability to build strong political coalitions that include established local leaders.
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A finance ministry that distributes funds accountably across levels of government can be vital for decentralization (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008) . Different offices of government are always in some competition for public resources under any system, but this competition is exacerbated when different levels of government are controlled by rival parties in a federal democracy. Thus, political decentralization increases the need for a central finance ministry that can reliably and transparently distribute public funds to different levels of government. In this sense, the decentralized distribution of autonomous budgetary power to local governments may depend on effective administrative controls against moral hazard in the central government. In the early development of English government from the twelfth century, the first key institution was the Exchequer, which regulated financial relations between national and provincial governments (Fitznigel, 1189; Warren, 1973) . So a democratic federal state may stand on three institutional pillars: a multi-party national assembly, elected local councils, and an effective finance ministry with clear rules for allocating of federal revenues between these bodies.
Political decentralization has been applied less in Africa than in other parts of the world.
In a 2007 survey of 82 selected countries around the world (UCLG, 2007) , the average share of national GDP spent by local governments was about 6.6%, but the average in sub-Saharan Africa was only 1.8%, with all countries well below the global average.
Nigeria has had imperfectly competitive elections at both the national and provincial levels since 1999. Our theory of federalism reducing entry barriers into national politics suggests that we should expect to see some governors who have provided superior public services in their provinces becoming popular candidates for national leadership, as voters around the nation should want such successful governors to provide similar benefits for the whole nation. In fact, a few governors seem to have earned reputations for providing better local government, but their ability to offer themselves as candidates for president has apparently been limited by inter-regional suspicions in Nigeria. A governor who has provided superior public service for the people of his province might not appeal to voters elsewhere if they thought that he would use presidential power only to benefit people in his old province. So regionally divided political identities may reduce the competitive benefits of federal democracy.
Implications for political reform and development assistance
The key to successful democratic development is to increase the supply of leaders who 13 have reputations for using public funds responsibly to provide public services, and not just to give patronage jobs to their supporters. This proposition is the main conclusion of the arguments in this paper. I have argued that substantial political change must be embodied in the personal reputations of political leaders, and that effective democratic competition depends on voters having an ample supply of trusted candidates with proven records of good public service.
Decentralized democracy maximizes opportunities for increasing this vital supply of good democratic reputations.
The arguments here have been theoretical. Indeed, our main proposition may seem hard to test or refute empirically, as we could hardly expect to find many politicians with reputations for good public service in a nation where democracy has failed to provide much benefit for the mass of citizens. But our theory suggests that the chances for successful development can be improved by reforms and policies that create opportunities and incentives for local leaders to begin building such reputations for spending public funds responsibly. Thus, the argument here has testable policy implications for development assistance and political reform.
When authority over substantial public budgets is distributed across two or more separately elected levels of government, officials at the lower local level have opportunities to develop a reputation for spending public funds effectively, and the possibility of winning election to higher office can motivate their efforts to earn such a reputation. Thus, the possibility of democratic advancement in decentralized federal democracy can provide an incentivecompatible mechanism for increasing the supply of trusted political leaders who can improve governance and eliminate corruption. This mechanism relies, however, on both democracy and decentralization, together with a clear constitutional distribution of power and budgetary authority to each level of government.
Those who would encourage beneficial political reforms should understand that this mechanism would not function as well in a centralized presidential democracy where responsible executive authority is concentrated in the hands of one elected national leader, who then has little incentive to raise popular expectations. Indeed, one might find more opportunities for independent political development of reputations for responsible public service in a decentralized federal system without multi-party democracy, as in China today.
Up to a point, the effect of encouraging more competitive political entry could be increased by having more elected sub-national governments in smaller districts, thus creating 14 more opportunities for more politicians to demonstrate their ability to serve the public.
(Concerns about regional separatism could also be a reason to limit political decentralization to local councils for small districts that are too small to stand alone against the rest of the nation.) But our argument imposes one important constraint: The districts must be large enough, and the responsibilities of public administration in each district must be substantial enough, so that a politician's good performance in one locally elected office can be taken by the voters as evidence of his qualifications for service in higher levels of government. From this perspective, an ideal system of federal democracy would have several levels of sub-national governments, with elected offices at different levels together forming a ladder of democratic political advancement that effective leaders can climb from local politics to provincial and national politics.
Competitive political entry can also be strengthened by foreign economic assistance when foreign-assistance funds are used to create more opportunities for national and local leaders to demonstrate their ability to use public funds responsibly in the public interest. When economic development depends on political development, the essential measure of success for a development project may be, not in how many schools or roads it builds, but in how the project enhances the reputations of the political leaders who spend the project's funds. This reputational effect requires that development projects should be clearly directed and controlled by national or local leaders, not by foreign aid administrators. The largest share of assistance funds may normally be given to projects that are directed by the national government; but, as Collier (2007) has argued, such aid should be conditioned on the right of donors also to fund projects also for other local public service agencies. Even if the national leadership might view some of these groups as potential political rivals, an essential goal should be to help citizens find more trusted options for leadership at both national and local levels. Thus, donors could help to increase the nation's supply of leaders with good reputations by distributing some share of developmentassistance funds to autonomous leaders of provincial and local governments. Donors could even consider funding some development projects for minority parties in the national assembly.
For this reputational goal, and to clearly distinguish foreign development assistance from covert efforts to achieve political influence, donors must also insist on transparent public accounting for all funds that are spent by political leaders at all levels. The essential accounting here must be to the local population, however, not to foreign donors who provided the funds.
Local people must be able to learn what funds were spent by their leaders and must be able to 15 monitor what public services were provided by these funds. Doubtless, many will be seen to have wasted money on graft and corruption. But if the national government cannot achieve public benefits commensurate with the assistance funds that it has received, then other local leaders who are seen to do better with their assistance funds may be recognized as the new leadership that the nation needs. Such a mechanism may seem inconvenient to established national leaders, but it would provide an incentive for them to improve governance and eliminate corruption.
